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ABSTRACT
Facial attributes, emerging soft biometrics, must be automatically and reliably extracted from images
in order to be usable in stand-alone systems. While recent methods extract facial attributes using
deep neural networks (DNNs) trained on labeled facial attribute data, the robustness of deep attribute
representations has not been evaluated. In this paper, we examine the representational stability of
several approaches that recently advanced the state of the art on the CelebA benchmark by generat-
ing adversarial examples formed by adding small, non-random perturbations to inputs yielding altered
classifications. We show that our fast flipping attribute (FFA) technique generates more adversarial ex-
amples than traditional algorithms, and that the adversarial robustness of DNNs varies highly between
facial attributes. We also test the correlation of facial attributes and find that only for related attributes
do the formed adversarial perturbations change the classification of others. Finally, we introduce the
concept of natural adversarial samples, i.e., misclassified images where predictions can be corrected
via small perturbations. We demonstrate that natural adversarial samples commonly occur and show
that many of these images remain misclassified even with additional training epochs, even though their
correct classification may require only a small adjustment to network parameters.
c© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Facial attributes have several interesting properties from a
recognition perspective. First, they are semantically meaning-
ful to humans which offers a level of interpretation beyond that
achieved by most conventional recognition algorithms. This al-
lows for novel applications, including descriptive searches, e.g.,
“Caucasian female with blond hair” (Kumar et al., 2008, 2011;
Scheirer et al., 2012), verification systems (Kumar et al., 2009),
facial ordering (Parikh and Grauman, 2011), and social senti-
ment analysis (Zhang et al., 2015). Second, they provide infor-
mation that is more or less independent of that distilled by con-
ventional recognition algorithms, potentially allowing for the
creation of more accurate and robust systems, narrowing down
the search space, and increasing efficiency at match time. Fi-
nally, facial attributes are interesting due to their ability to con-
vey meaningful identity information about a previously unseen
face, e.g., not enrolled in a gallery or used to train a classifier.
∗∗Corresponding author
e-mail: arozsa@uccs.edu (Andras Rozsa)
Recent approaches to facial attribute classification have
yielded impressive performance gains by leveraging powerful
deep learning models. These approaches generally fall into two
categories. While researchers like Liu et al. (2015) attempt
to extract a generic face representation across large amounts
of face data and then train shallower classifiers for attribute
prediction, Rudd et al. (2016) optimize over attribute data di-
rectly. Rudd et al. (2016) demonstrated that the latter approach
achieves superior performance, despite using smaller quantities
of data. Thus, we examine the latter approach in this paper as it
is more readily applicable to real-world tasks.
While optimizing an end-to-end network for attribute clas-
sification yields exceptional performance, recent research
(Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015) raises the ques-
tion: Does using pure end-to-end deep networks – i.e., not sim-
ply as feature extractors but as attribute classifiers themselves
– induce a risk of non-robust attribute representations for real-
world applications? Specifically, Szegedy et al. (2014) discov-
ered that deep neural networks are susceptible to carefully cho-
sen perturbations of even a few pixels. By adding such pertur-
bations – that can be imperceptible to humans – to the original
images, the resulting adversarial images become misclassified,
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(a) Natural Adversarial: female→ male via line-search FFA (0.999)
+ =
(b) Adversarial: wearing lipstick→ no lipstick via line-search FFA (0.997)
+ ==
(c) Natural Adversarial: female→ male via iterative FFA (0.999)
+ =
(d) Adversarial: wearing lipstick→ no lipstick via iterative FFA (0.998)
Fig. 1: ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES BY ATTRIBUTE FLIPPING. This paper demonstrates the problem of natural adversarial samples and how
to generate adversarial examples for binary attributes by the novel fast flipping attribute (FFA) technique. Adversarial examples are formed by
adding small, non-random perturbations to original inputs; while the modifications can remain imperceptible to human observers, vulnerable
machine learning models classify the original and adversarial examples differently. In (a), we display a natural adversarial man (misclassified as
a woman) that is “corrected” by an imperceptible perturbation formed via line-search on our separate attribute network. In (b), we show a woman
with correctly classified attribute “wearing lipstick” that is flipped indicating “no lipstick” using FFA with line-search on the mixed objective
optimization network (MOON) (Rudd et al., 2016). With the computationally more expensive iterative FFA, in general, we can further improve
the quality of the formed adversarial examples as shown in (c) and (d), where the higher perceptual adversarial similarity scores (PASS) (Rozsa
et al., 2016b) displayed in sub-captions indicate increased structural similarities between the original and perturbed image pairs. Due to attribute
correlations learned by MOON, the perturbations formed by the two versions of FFA that alter the classification of “wearing lipstick” also change
the classifications of “attractive” and “heavy makeup” attributes to be absent. Perturbations in the middle are magnified by a factor of 10 to
enhance visibility, where gray pixels indicate no change.
even with high confidence.
Research on adversarial images has been conducted since,
and these images can be easily generated independently from
the dataset, network topology, training regime, hyperparameter
choice, and activation type. In our experiments, we attempt to
generate adversarial images over a random subset of the CelebA
dataset (Liu et al., 2015) using the fast gradient sign (FGS)
method (Goodfellow et al., 2015) and our novel fast flipping
attribute (FFA) algorithm that efficiently leverages the back-
propagation of a Euclidean loss defined on classification score-
vectors of input images without requiring ground-truth labels.
We find that classifications for some attributes are difficult to
change with both FGS and FFA, and that the number of adver-
sarial images does not decrease during training.
To date, adversarial images have been presented as inputs
with the presence of slight artificial perturbations where the
original input is correctly classified and the adversarial input
is misclassified. In this paper, we pose the reverse question: Do
there exist misclassified inputs on which we can induce small
artificial perturbations to correct the classification? or Do ad-
versarial images naturally occur? We find that the answer is
yes, there are images in the training set which, even after they
were used for training, are misclassified by a given facial at-
tribute network but can be flipped to the proper classification
via an imperceptible perturbation. Further, we find that even
with additional training, many of these natural adversarial sam-
ples are not learned by the networks. One might think correctly
learning these natural adversarial samples requires only a minor
adjustment to the network parameters, but it seems that proxim-
ity in image space does not mean proximity in feature space.
In Fig. 1, we show adversarial images that occurred in our
experiments conducted on the separate attribute networks and
the mixed objective optimization network (MOON) (Rudd et al.,
2016). As shown in Figs. 1(a) and (c), a natural adversarial im-
age of a man (left) is misclassified as a woman on our separate
attribute network, and a small perturbation (center) applied to
the image (right) would correct the classification. Figs. 1(b)
and (d) contain a woman correctly classified as wearing lip-
stick (left) that is turned into a person with no lipstick (right)
on MOON by adding a small perturbation (center). Interest-
ingly, the same perturbations also change the classification of
the person to non-attractive and to not wearing heavy makeup,
indicating that those attributes might be learned by MOON as
correlated. Note that the real perturbations are much smaller
than shown in Fig. 1, and we magnified the pixel changes by a
factor of 10 for better visualization. Since perturbations can be
positive and negative, gray pixels correspond to no change.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
3• We show that end-to-end DNNs provide excellent perfor-
mance in facial attribute classification.
• We generate adversarial images on our separate facial at-
tribute networks at two training epochs and after they con-
verged. We find that these networks attain no additional
robustness to adversarial images with longer training.
• We introduce the notion of natural adversarial images and
analyze their prevalence using our data and networks. We
find that the frequency of naturally occurring adversarial
images is quite large, accounting for nearly 73 % of the
training set images that are incorrectly classified by our
separate facial attribute networks.
• We present two variants of the fast flipping attribute (FFA)
algorithm for adversarial image generation and demon-
strate their capabilities of flipping attribute classifications.
• We analyze a multi-objective attribute representation and
examine the correlations between facial attributes by gen-
erating adversarial examples.
2. Attribute Classification
The automatic classification of facial attributes was pio-
neered by Kumar et al. (2009). Their classifiers depended heav-
ily on face alignment, and each attribute used combinations of
features from hand-picked facial regions, e.g., cheeks, mouth,
etc. The feature spaces consisted of various normalizations and
aggregations of color spaces and image gradients. Different
features were selected for each attribute, and one RBF-SVM
per attribute was independently trained for classification.
More recent approaches leverage deep neural networks
(DNNs) to extract features. Many use a generic deep feature
space representation obtained by training for other face process-
ing tasks. For example, Liu et al. (2015) utilized three DNNs –
a combination of two localization networks (LNets) and an at-
tribute recognition network (ANet) – to first localize faces and
then extract facial attributes. The ANet is initially trained on
external data to identify people and then fine-tuned using all
attributes to extract features that are fed into independent lin-
ear SVMs for the final attribute classification. Similarly, Wang
et al. (2016) used an external dataset that they collected inside
different areas of New York City. Using weather and estimated
ethnicity information to automatically predict attributes, such
as skin color or the presence of sunglasses or scarfs, they pre-
trained a DNN to extract features. Again, attribute classification
was performed using one linear SVM per attribute.
Both Rozsa et al. (2016a) and Rudd et al. (2016) found that
optimizing directly over facial attribute data yields superior per-
formance, even when using a much smaller training set. Re-
cently, Kalayeh et al. (2017) showed that semantic segmenta-
tion further improves attribute classification accuracy. Their
8.20 % overall classification error presents the current state of
the art on the CelebA dataset. In this paper, we analyze two ap-
proaches that leverage attribute data directly: one in which we
train a separate deep network for each attribute (Rozsa et al.,
2016a), and another in which we optimize across all attribute
labels in a multi-objective loss function (Rudd et al., 2016).
2.1. Network Classification
For our separate attribute classifiers (Rozsa et al., 2016a), we
adopted the 16-layer VGG network topology of Parkhi et al.
(2015), with two modifications. First, we altered the dimen-
sion of the RGB image input layer from 224 × 224 pixels to
178 × 218 pixels which is the resolution of the aligned CelebA
images. Second, we replaced the final softmax loss with Eu-
clidean loss on the label. We chose Euclidean loss – opposed to
softmax, sigmoid, or hinge loss – because attributes lie along a
continuous range while sigmoids tend to enforce saturation and
hinge-loss enforces a large margin, neither of which is consis-
tent with our intuition.
To disambiguate between tensors/matrices, vectors, and
scalars, let v denote a tensor or matrix, ~v denote a vector and
v denote a scalar for an arbitrary variable v. For an image x
with label y ∈ {−1,+1} indicating the absence or presence of an
attribute, respectively, let f (x) be the DNN classification deci-
sion. Then the Euclidean loss J is:
J(θ, x, y) =
∥∥∥ f (x) − y∥∥∥2, (1)
where θ represents the parameters of the DNN model.
To maintain comparability with other research reporting on
the same dataset, and since the dataset only contains binary at-
tribute labels, we decided to apply a classification function to
the network output that was trained with Euclidean loss. For an
input x, the classification result c(x) and its corresponding error
e(x, y) are obtained by thresholding f (x) at 0:
c(x) =
+1 if f (x) > 0−1 otherwise, e(x, y) =
0 if y · c(x) > 01 otherwise. (2)
The classification error over the whole dataset X of N images
with attribute labels Y is then given by:
E(X,Y) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
e(Xn,Yn) . (3)
A more pragmatic approach in terms of storage and pro-
cessing costs can be obtained by optimizing over all labels si-
multaneously, under one mixed objective optimization network
(MOON) (Rudd et al., 2016). Given an image x, with a vector
of M attribute labels, ~y, the per-sample loss is given by:
J(θ, x, ~y) =
M∑
i=1
∥∥∥ fi(x) − ~yi∥∥∥2. (4)
By close analogy to (3), the classification error across the
dataset with matrix Y of multi-attribute labels is given by:
E(X,Y) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
M∑
i=1
e(Xn,Yni) . (5)
2.2. Dataset
For our experiments, we use the publicly available CelebA
dataset (Liu et al., 2015). CelebA consists of more than 200k
images showing faces in a variety of different facial expres-
sions, occlusions and illuminations, and poses from frontal to
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Fig. 2: ATTRIBUTE CLASSIFICATION ERROR ON CELEBA. This figure shows the classification errors on the test set of the CelebA dataset for
our separate networks and MOON compared to three other algorithms, sorted based on the result of the separate networks. The Trivial approach
assigns each attribute to the majority class of the training set. The results of FaceTracer and LNets+ANet are taken from Liu et al. (2015) and
results of MOON from Rudd et al. (2016).
full profile. Approximately 160k images are used for training,
and the remaining 40k images are equally split up into valida-
tion and test sets. Each image is annotated with binary labels of
40 facial attributes. We conducted our evaluation using the set
of pre-cropped face images included in the dataset which are
aligned using hand-annotated facial landmarks.
2.3. Experiments
We conducted a comparison of our separate per-attribute neu-
ral networks with other attribute algorithms on the previously
described CelebA dataset. Due to memory limitations, we set
the training batch size to 64 images per iteration. Thus, the
training requires approximately 2,500 iterations to run a full
epoch on the training set. In opposition to Parkhi et al. (2015),
we did not incorporate any dataset augmentation or mirroring;
we trained networks purely on the aligned images. We selected
a learning rate of 10−5. During training, we updated DNN
weights using an RMSProp update rule with an inverse learning
rate decay policy. Using the GPU implementation of Caffe (Jia
et al., 2014), we trained all 40 networks until convergence on
the validation set which occurred between two and ten epochs
depending on the attribute.
A comparison of our results on the CelebA test set with the
original FaceTracer approach by Kumar et al. (2009) as well
as the LNets+ANet approach of Liu et al. (2015) is shown in
Fig. 2. Although Kalayeh et al. (2017) presented the current
state of the art in attribute classification on CelebA, they did
not provide detailed information about single attributes and are,
hence, left out of Fig. 2. Due to the highly biased distributions
of attribute labels in the CelebA dataset, we also included a
Trivial algorithm that simply predicts the class with the higher
occurrence in the training set. For some attributes, such as
Attractive or Male (which are approximately balanced in the
test set), the Trivial classifier obtains high errors, while for at-
tributes like Narrow Eyes or Double Chin, the Trivial classi-
fier even outperforms the generic feature space approaches, i.e.,
FaceTracer and LNets+ANet. Only our separate networks and
MOON outperform the Trivial approach for all attributes.
Our approach using separate DNNs yields a mean classifi-
cation error of 9.20 %, a relative improvement of 27 % over
LNets+ANet (12.70 % classification error) and 51 % improve-
ment over FaceTracer (18.88 % classification error). While our
result does not reach the 8.20 % error of Kalayeh et al. (2017), it
is statistically not significantly worse than the 9.06 % of MOON
(Rudd et al., 2016). Interestingly, we are “only” 54 % better in
terms of relative improvement than the Trivial system achieving
19.96 % mean classification error. For certain attributes, espe-
cially those not related to face identity, e.g., Wearing Necklace,
Wearing Earrings, or Blurry our approach yields dramatic gains
over the generic feature space approaches. LNets+ANet out-
performs our separate networks on a few attributes but never by
more than a percentage point in classification error.
3. Adversarial Images for Attributes
An adversarial image is an image that looks very close to
(and is generally indistinguishable from) the original image
from the perspective of a human observer, but differs dramati-
cally in classification by a machine-learned classifier. Multiple
techniques have been proposed to create adversarial examples.
The first reliable technique of Szegedy et al. (2014) used a box-
constrained optimization (L-BFGS) algorithm. Starting with a
randomly chosen modification, it aims to find the smallest per-
turbation in the input space that causes the perturbed image to
be classified as a predefined target label. Baluja et al. (2015)
proposed generating affine perturbations, applying them to in-
put samples, and then observing how models respond to these
perturbed images. While, from an adversarial perspective, this
approach has the advantage of not requiring knowledge of inter-
nal network representations, it relies on “guess and check”, i.e.,
5it creates random perturbations and determines if the results are
misclassified which can be prohibitively expensive.
Goodfellow et al. (2015) introduced a more efficient algo-
rithm to form adversarial perturbations. Their fast gradient sign
(FGS) method creates perturbations by using the sign of the gra-
dient of loss with respect to the input. FGS is computationally
efficient as it requires only one gradient being effectively calcu-
lated via backpropagation, while L-BFGS needs multiple. Ex-
periments demonstrate that FGS reliably causes a wide variety
of learning models to misclassify their perturbed inputs, includ-
ing shallow models, but deep networks are especially suscepti-
ble (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Note that FGS is based directly
upon network information, namely the gradient of loss.
Although the definition of adversarial example varies
(Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Baluja et al.,
2015), at their core, adversarial examples are modified inputs
formed by imperceptible non-random perturbations that are
misclassified by machine learning models. Hence, humans
should not perceive differences between adversarial and orig-
inal inputs. To formalize the definition, let x be an input image
correctly classified as y. An adversarial perturbation η is given
if the perturbed image x˜ = x + η is not classified as y:
f (x) = y and f (x˜) , y. (6)
This is a necessary but not sufficient condition as the modifica-
tion needs to be imperceptible. Various measures such as L1,
L2, or L∞ distances have been used to show how close the per-
turbed images are to their originals. However, these measures
are not well matched to human perception (Sabour et al., 2016)
as they are very sensitive to even small geometric distortions
that may still result in plausible images. Instead, we seek a
measure of similarity in a psychophysical sense. The percep-
tual adversarial similarity score (PASS) (Rozsa et al., 2016b)
measures similarity S (x˜, x) based on structural photometric-
invariant differences, by first performing a homography align-
ment to maximize the enhanced correlation coefficient (ECC)
(Evangelidis and Psarakis, 2008) between the perturbed image
and the original, then computing the structural similarity in-
dex (SSIM) (Flynn et al., 2013) between the aligned images.
The homography transform removes differences due to plau-
sible translations and rotations, while SSIM measures struc-
tural differences not stemming from perturbations that appear
as plausible photometric differences. We believe that the resul-
tant PASS is a suitable measure of the degree to which an image
is adversarial. Consistent with Flynn et al. (2013), we adopt the
PASS threshold τ = 0.95 as a cutoff for adversarial.
3.1. Adversarial Image Generation
We explore two approaches for generating the necessary per-
turbations η. Goodfellow et al. (2015) introduced FGS to find
adversarial perturbations. Given a DNN with parameters θ and
an image x, FGS searches for perturbations that cause mislabel-
ing using the sign of the gradient of loss:
η
fgs
=  sign
(∇xJ(θ, x, y)) . (7)
FGS takes steps in the direction that is defined by the gradient
of loss in order to cause mislabeling. This requires knowledge
of the label y of the image x. We introduce a novel approach –
the fast flipping attribute (FFA) algorithm – that directly relies
on the classification scores. By defining a target score-vector
~ti(x) that zeros out the attribute in question and leaving others
unchanged (if any), a Euclidean loss can be employed to move
f (x) towards this target and, eventually, alter the classification
of the particular facial attribute. In general, ~ti(x) can be formal-
ized as:
~ti(x) =
 0 if j = if j(x) otherwise. (8)
In order to form adversarial perturbations, we use a Euclidean
loss between ~ti(x) and the network prediction and apply its gra-
dient with respect to the input image x. Formally:
η
ffa =  ∇x
(
1
2
∥∥∥∥~ti(x) − f (x)∥∥∥∥2) (9)
can be obtained by using the gradient of the Euclidean loss cal-
culated via backpropagation. For separate attribute networks
trained with Euclidean loss, f (x) consists of a single value and,
thus, the formed ~ti(x) has one element (which is zero). For
MOON, the formed score-vector ~ti(x) contains one zero ele-
ment for the particular attribute that we aim to alter.
By using FGS or FFA, we can obtain directions that define
varying perturbations η with respect to a given input image x.
To effectively search for the smallest perturbations that cause
classification errors along those directions, we apply a line-
search technique with increasing step sizes to reach the weight
 in (7) and (9) that causes mislabeling. By doubling the step
size after each step, those directions can be quickly discovered.
When the line-search oversteps and the classification of the per-
turbed example changes, we apply a binary search within the
latest section of the line-search to find the smallest possible ad-
versarial perturbation. Due to these enhancements, adversarial
generation with FFA and FGS approaches achieve comparable
computational efficiency.
Alternatively, to form higher quality adversarial examples
both FGS (Kurakin et al., 2017) and FFA can be used itera-
tively – with an increased computational cost. Instead of cal-
culating gradients once, iterative approaches take a small step
with L∞ = 1 to form a temporary image, recalculate the appli-
cable loss and its gradient with respect to that image, and up-
date it until the classification of the desired attribute is flipped.
While the generated adversarial images have rounded discrete
pixel values in range [0, 255], iterative FFA temporarily utilizes
non-discrete pixel values in order to obtain better adversarial
quality. Due to the nature of using the sign in (7), iterative FGS
only operates on discrete pixel values.
3.2. Natural Adversarial Images
As of today, adversarial images have been artificially gener-
ated via a computational process, but no one – to our knowl-
edge – has yet addressed whether adversarial examples occur
among natural images: Are there misclassified images for which
imperceptible perturbations to inputs yield correct classifica-
tions? We seek to explore how often adversarial images natu-
rally occur. Thus, we formalize the novel concept of natural
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Fig. 3: ADVERSARIAL SUCCESS. This figure shows the success rates of adversarial example generation techniques for adversarial examples
(correctly classified images, +) and natural adversarial samples (incorrectly classified images, −) generated on the converged networks trained with
Euclidean loss using FGS and FFA, and on MOON using FFA (denoted as MFFA), using PASS threshold τ = 0.95. Results of these techniques
utilizing line-search (top) and the iterative approach (bottom) are sorted by the success rate of FGS+ examples formed via line-search, and are
based on 1,000 images randomly selected from the CelebA training set.
adversarial images. Let x′ be an incorrectly classified image
with ground-truth label y. Then x′ is a natural adversarial im-
age if there exists a perturbation η′ such that perturbed image
x˜′ = x′ + η′ is correctly classified as y:
f (x′) , y and f (x˜′) = y, (10)
under the premise that S(x˜′, x′) ≥ τ. Hence, a natural adver-
sarial sample is a misclassified image whose prediction can be
corrected by an imperceptible modification. Interestingly, the
same processes used to generate adversarial images can be used
to analyze if a misclassified input is a natural adversarial.
3.3. Experiments
To test and compare adversarial example generation with
FGS and FFA, we randomly selected 1,000 images of the
CelebA training set and performed experiments trying to flip
facial attribute classifications. For the separate attribute net-
works, we used FGS and FFA both via line-search and itera-
tively. As FGS simply increases the loss until misclassification
occurs, it cannot be used to flip an arbitrarily selected attribute
on MOON. Therefore, we only utilized FFA on MOON.
For each attribute and for both the correctly and incorrectly
classified images, we counted the number of times in which an
adversarial image could be created, i.e., where an η exists for
which S(x, x + η) ≥ τ with τ = 0.95, for an η generated by ei-
ther of the two algorithms. The per-attribute results can be ob-
tained in Fig. 3. Interestingly, for some attributes, such as Big
Nose or Young, most input images can be turned adversarial,
while for others like Wavy Hair or Wearing Necklace, adver-
sarial samples cannot be formed at all on the separate attribute
networks. Even more astonishingly, incorrectly classified im-
ages can be corrected by small perturbations more frequently
than altering the predictions for correctly classified images via
adversarial perturbations. Also, the number of adversarial ex-
amples generated using FFA is generally higher than for FGS,
while almost all images that spawned FGS adversarial exam-
ples also spawned FFA adversarial examples.
Interestingly, on MOON we could generate adversarial im-
ages for almost all attributes, cf. MFFA in Fig. 3. Particularly,
the number of natural adversarial examples that we could form
on MOON – for both versions of FFA (line-search and itera-
tive) – is generally high with an average rate of more than 90 %.
This indicates that for most of the misclassified training images,
adding an imperceptible perturbation will correct their classifi-
cation. On the other hand, the number of adversarial examples
generated on the correctly classified images is lower.
To better compare the robustness of the separate attribute net-
7Table 1: FACIAL ATTRIBUTE FLIPPABILITY BY PASS. This table contains the proportions of perturbed images yielding altered classifications
generated via FGS or FFA on the converged separate attribute models – trained with either Euclidean or softmax loss – and on the mixed objective
optimization network (MOON) via FFA (denoted as MFFA). The relative number of adversarial images formed with either the line-search or the
iterative approach, which could be flipped with different PASS thresholds τ, are presented. The last column contains the total number of correctly
classified (algorithms appended with +) and incorrectly classified (algorithms appended with −) attributes by the respective DNNs. Adversarial
examples were created for 1,000 original images randomly sampled from the CelebA training set and are identical across all experiments.
Loss Adv. Type
Line-Search Iterative
Total
τ = 0 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.95 τ = 0.99 τ = 0 τ = 0.9 τ = 0.95 τ = 0.99
Euclidean
FGS+ 41.8% 26.5% 23.0% 11.1% 56.6% 45.8% 40.5% 18.3% 36210
FFA+ 47.2% 38.1% 36.6% 30.0% 65.7% 63.6% 59.7% 47.0% 36210
MFFA+ 55.3% 46.2% 44.0% 33.5% 84.3% 81.9% 73.8% 49.9% 37288
FGS− 73.8% 62.5% 59.2% 45.5% 78.3% 74.2% 70.1% 53.0% 3790
FFA− 75.0% 73.3% 72.6% 68.5% 75.4% 75.4% 75.3% 73.5% 3790
MFFA− 95.6% 95.3% 95.0% 92.0% 94.9% 94.9% 94.6% 92.7% 2712
Softmax
FGS+ 58.5% 40.6% 32.5% 12.7% 88.5% 78.5% 67.5% 21.9% 37108
FFA+ 67.0% 59.9% 57.2% 43.9% 80.5% 80.4% 78.4% 64.8% 37108
FGS− 91.1% 87.3% 84.1% 62.2% 96.7% 95.8% 94.8% 73.1% 2892
FFA− 90.6% 89.4% 89.0% 84.9% 91.1% 91.0% 90.7% 89.9% 2892
works and MOON to FGS or FFA techniques, we also collected
the proportion of images we were able to generate on these net-
works that alter attribute classifications – adversarial examples
with S (x, x+η) ≥ 0.95 as well as non-adversarial samples with
S (x, x + η) < 0.95. The results with various adversarial quali-
ties indicated by the different PASS thresholds τ are shown in
the top of Tab. 1. Considering only the separate attribute net-
works, we can see that FFA outperforms FGS in terms of the
sheer number of altered attribute classifications, and with in-
creasing adversarial quality thresholds the difference between
the two techniques widens. For example, while overall 41.8 %
and 47.2 % of the correctly classified attributes can be flipped
using FGS and FFA via line-search, the proportions of adver-
sarial examples (PASS threshold τ = 0.95) among those are
23.0 % and 36.6 %, respectively. Comparing the separate at-
tribute networks with MOON, we can observe that more ad-
versarial examples can be created on the slightly more accurate
MOON, which highlights that accuracy and adversarial robust-
ness are not necessarily correlated. For example, with itera-
tive FFA 59.7 % of the correctly classified facial attributes can
be altered, while on MOON this increases to 73.8 %. These
results also demonstrate that, in general, the computationally
more expensive iterative approach is capable of flipping facial
attribute classifications more frequently and with higher adver-
sarial quality than the more traditional line-search technique.
On MOON, FFA via line-search yields 44.0 % of flipped classi-
fications on the correctly classified facial attributes at τ = 0.95.
While using the iterative approach, we managed to form adver-
sarial perturbations for 73.8 % of the same attributes.
To test how the number of adversarial images changes during
training, for the separate attribute networks we generated adver-
sarial images for the same 1,000 examples on DNNs trained for
two epochs. Intuition would suggest that DNNs are able to learn
adversarial samples that exist at two epochs, and thus the total
number of adversarial images would decrease with additional
training iterations. Especially for natural adversarial images,
i.e., images that were misclassified by DNNs at two epochs for
which imperceptible modifications to those images would cor-
rect their predictions, one would assume that further training
would make the networks learn such examples.
The results of these experiments, which are listed in detail in
the top half of Tab. 2, are counter-intuitive. For FGS, the total
number of adversarial images over all attributes that we were
able to create slightly increased from 8,827 to 10,587, while
more than half of the images (5,884) were in both sets (which
includes images that were misclassified before and now classi-
fied correctly and vice versa). For FFA, the numbers for DNNs
at two epochs and after convergence are similar, and for most
vulnerable input images we could create adversarial samples on
both the converged and unconverged networks.
In general, the total number of incorrectly classified images
for which adversarial samples could be created was consistent
between two epochs and convergence, although at least half of
the original input images differed. This also means that half
of the images for which an imperceptible modification would
have been sufficient to classify them correctly were not cor-
rected with additional training. We found that of the 1,279 im-
ages that were natural FFA adversarial samples at two epochs
but are not natural adversarial on the converged networks, the
majority (1,048) were classified correctly by the converged net-
works. The numbers we obtained for FGS adversarial examples
are similar.
4. Adversarial Portability and Correlation
In this section, we evaluate the portability of adversarial ex-
amples generated on the separate attribute networks, and ana-
lyze the correlation of facial attributes on MOON.
4.1. Adversarial Portability
It is natural to ask: To what extent do adversarial images
generated on one facial attribute network affect classifications
of other networks? To answer this question, we took the pre-
viously generated adversarial examples formed on one of the
8Table 2: PROGRESS OF ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS. This table
shows the total numbers of FGS and FFA adversarial images generated
with line-search on the separate attribute classification networks at two
epochs and after convergence, trained with either Euclidean or softmax
loss. We show numbers of adversarial examples (correctly classified
images, +) and natural adversarial samples (incorrectly classified im-
ages, −) over all attributes with τ = 0.95. The overlap represents the
number of images that are sources of adversarial instances both at two
epochs and after convergence. Adversarial examples were created for
1,000 original images randomly sampled from the CelebA training set
and are identical across all experiments.
Loss Adv. Type 2 Epochs Converged Overlap
Euclidean
FGS+ 6393 8345 4616
FFA+ 13621 13268 9881
FGS− 2434 2242 1268
FFA− 2918 2753 1639
Softmax
FGS+ 6833 12047 5896
FFA+ 16371 21218 15259
FGS− 2385 2431 1315
FFA− 2844 2573 1721
separate attribute networks and tested whether these perturbed
images influence the prediction of other attribute networks. The
results are shown in Fig. 4. For these experiments, we report the
average percentage of cross-model portability.
On the left, we present the portability of adversarial sam-
ples between the converged networks. Interestingly, most of the
perturbations for one attribute do not influence other attributes.
However, for some attributes we can observe higher correla-
tions. For example, 26 % of the adversarial samples for Goatee
also flip No Beard, and adversarial samples created for several
attributes like Chubby, Double Chin, Pale Skin, and Young in-
fluence the Attractive attribute. For certain attributes, like Wear-
ing Earrings and Wearing Hat, we were not able to create ad-
versarial samples and, hence, these columns are empty.
On the right of Fig. 4, we report the results of a similar ex-
periment. We checked if the adversarial examples formed on
the two-epoch networks were still adversarial on the converged
networks. On the diagonal, we can see how many adversarial
inputs created on the two epoch networks remained adversarial
on the converged DNNs. Note that the Narrow Eyes network
had already converged after two epochs. On average, more
than 30 % of the adversarial images were not learned by the
networks, i.e., the same small perturbations still changed the
classifications. Notably, the cross-network portability of adver-
sarial samples increased, e.g., around 50 % of the adversarial
images created on the Pale Skin network at two epochs flipped
the classification of the converged Heavy Makeup network.
4.2. Adversarial Correlation
A similar experiment can be conducted on the mixed objec-
tive optimization network (MOON). Since MOON is a single
network estimating all attributes simultaneously, this experi-
ment does not test adversarial portability (across networks) but
adversarial correlation. We took adversarial images generated
via FFA for a certain attribute – assuming the PASS threshold
τ = 0.95 as before – and checked which other attributes were
classified differently.
In Fig. 5, we plot the adversarial correlation for MOON us-
ing adversarial images generated with FFA both via line-search
and iteratively. Although τ = 0.95 indicates small perturba-
tions, we can observe that flipping one attribute changes the
classifications of other attributes more often than we observed
among separate attribute networks. Astonishingly, adversarial
images generated with iterative FFA, which forms adversarial
examples with much higher quality, flip related attributes more
frequently. For example, the No Beard attribute is flipped with
more than 70 % for adversarial images generated for Goatee,
Mustache, and Sideburns, while this is not true for the oppo-
site direction. Also, when adversarial images are generated for
Blurry, Chubby, Double Chin, Receding Hairline, and Young,
in more than 50 % of the cases, the Attractive attribute changes
as well. Since noses continue to grow as we age or gain weight,
the Big Nose attribute often flips when we generate adversarial
examples for Bald, Chubby, Double Chin, Gray Hair, or Re-
ceding Hairline. On the other hand, attributes that do not relate
to other attributes, such as Bald, Blurry, Pale Skin, Wearing
Hat, or Wearing Necktie were not affected by adversarial im-
ages generated on any other attribute.
Apparently, due to the simultaneous training of all at-
tributes by MOON, the correlations between attributes have
been learned much better than on separate attribute networks.
5. Euclidean versus Softmax Loss
In Sec. 2, we chose an uncommon loss function – Euclidean
loss – to train our separate facial attribute classification DNNs.
A key rationale for choosing this loss function is from Rudd
et al. (2016), i.e., that we expect that attributes extracted from
DNNs trained with Euclidean loss are better suited for face
recognition. Readers might ask which loss function leads to
better classification performance: Euclidean or softmax? To
answer this question, we trained separate attribute classifica-
tion networks using softmax loss. Compared to Euclidean loss
networks, DNNs trained with softmax loss yielded a slightly
higher classification error of 9.30 %, which is not statistically
significant (p ≈ 0.09 in a two-sided paired T-test).
To form adversarial examples on the separate attribute net-
works trained with softmax loss, we apply FGS using (7) and
FFA using (9) via line-search. For FFA, we form the adjusted
score-vector ~ti(x) for (8) on the output of the penultimate layer,
also known as logits, where two scores are calculated for each
input image indicating the presence or absence of the given fa-
cial attribute. As the larger value indicates the classification
among the two, we form a score-vector ~ti(x) where we change
the higher score to zero and leave the other unchanged in order
to flip the classification of the input.
When forming adversarial examples, we found that DNNs
trained with softmax loss are more vulnerable. As detailed in
the lower part of Tab. 2, using the same 1,000 examples from
the CelebA training set (cf. Sec. 3) we can generate 16,021
adversarial samples (adversarial and natural adversarial exam-
ples over all 40 attributes) using FFA on the converged DNNs
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Fig. 4: ADVERSARIAL PORTABILITY ACROSS SEPARATE NETWORKS. This figure shows the portability of adversarial examples across separate
attribute networks. Adversarial examples were created for 1,000 original images randomly sampled from the CelebA training set, which are
identical across all experiments. On the left, FFA adversarial images created on the converged networks of a given attribute are tested on all
converged networks. On the right, FFA adversarial images created on networks after two epochs are tested on the fully converged networks. All
networks were trained using Euclidean loss and adversarial images were generated via FFA using line-search.
trained with Euclidean loss, and 23,791 using FFA on softmax
loss DNNs. With FGS, these numbers are 10,587 and 14,478,
respectively. Similarly, as shown in the lower part of Tab. 1, we
can see that more adversarial images could be generated for all
PASS thresholds τ and for all adversarial generation techniques.
This is consistent with other research which demonstrates that
DNNs trained with softmax loss are generally vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we employed a simple and effective method
to train deep neural networks (DNNs) to perform binary fa-
cial attribute classification. Experiments on the CelebA dataset
demonstrate a critical advantage in optimizing directly over at-
tribute data. Even with our simple approach using separate at-
tribute networks, we are able to obtain a 9.20 % average clas-
sification error, and outperform the generic facial features ap-
proach LNets+ANet (12.70 %). This performance gain is sta-
tistically significant, resulting in p < 10−28 in a paired T-test.
Added optimizations in terms of more tenable model size and a
statistically non-significant (p ≈ 0.05) performance gain can be
achieved by the multi-objective optimization of MOON (Rudd
et al., 2016), which obtains 9.06 % classification error on the
CelebA benchmark.
We conducted a robustness analysis and introduced the fast
flipping attribute (FFA) algorithm, a fast and effective method
to generate adversarial images by flipping the binary decision
of the DNN. We demonstrated that FFA can create more ad-
versarial examples than the related fast gradient sign (FGS)
method. In comparison to Rozsa et al. (2016a), we extended
the FFA algorithm to be usable for multi-objective networks
such as MOON, and we implemented an iterative extension of
FFA. We showed empirically that iterative FFA generates better
quality adversarial examples and is able to flip attribute predic-
tions more frequently. Nevertheless, there are some attributes
that cannot be flipped on the separately trained DNNs.
We demonstrated that further training epochs do not make
separate attribute DNNs more robust to adversarial images.
Furthermore, most of the natural adversarial images, which
only require small modifications to be correctly classified, are
not corrected with the higher number of training iterations. Par-
ticularly for the convolutional layers, this exhibits that highly
localized perturbations cannot easily be balanced by small mod-
ifications to convolutional kernels as this would influence the
convolution result globally. Finally, at two epochs DNNs ob-
tained an average classification error of 9.78 % that is statisti-
cally significantly (p < 10−10 in a paired T-test) higher than the
9.20 % that we obtained with the converged DNNs.
In order to further improve the overall performance of our
networks, future work can also consider fine-tuning trained
DNN models with adversarial samples or hard positives (Rozsa
et al., 2016b), corrected natural adversarial samples, or even
augmented natural adversarial samples containing perturba-
tions with lower magnitudes than otherwise needed for correct-
ing misclassifications.
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Fig. 5: ATTRIBUTE CORRELATION ON MOON. This figure shows the correlation of facial attributes on MOON based on adversarial images
generated for single attributes. Adversarial examples were created for 1,000 original images randomly sampled from the CelebA training set,
which are identical across all experiments. On the left, FFA adversarial images were created via line-search. On the right, iterative FFA was used
for adversarial example generation.
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